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There are numerous examples in economic history of economies that have experi-
enced a comprehensive integration into a larger economic entity or into the global
economy. Examples comprise the ￿rst era of globalization (about 1820 until 1913)
with nearly perfect capital mobility and mass migration among Atlantic economies
(O￿ Rourke and Williamson, 1999), the uni￿cation of South and North Italy in 1862
(Boltho et al., 1997), the German Reuni￿cation in 1991 (Sinn, 2002) and the en-
largement of the European Union in 2004 to include many of the East European
economies (Mora et al., 2004). What are the dynamic consequences with regard to
income and welfare of such comprehensive integration shocks for speci￿c regions or
economies? The answer to this question appears all but trivial.
We argue that a careful analysis should account for increasing returns to scale
(IRS) and factor mobility. Employing a simple one-sector model of a small open
economy we ￿nd that the success of economic development in response to factor
market integration (FMI) is determined by history and expectations. Our analy-
sis contributes to a better understanding of the interaction between expectations
and fundamentals in models with indeterminacy. It is shown that (i) the relative
importance of expectations as determinant of economic success depends on total
factor productivity (TFP) and (ii) admissible expectations depend on fundamentals
(initial conditions and TFP) in a systematic fashion. This insight has far reaching
economic implications. For instance, it is shown that bad institutions may hinder
1favorable economic development because su¢ ciently optimistic expectations cannot
be fundamentally warranted under this side condition.
In search for an answer to our research question, international trade theory seems
to be the natural starting point. Provided that a set of neoclassical conditions (in-
cluding constant returns to scale) holds, trade liberalization induces, ￿rst, (incom-
plete) specialization in goods production according to the principle of comparative
advantages and, second, international equalization of factor rewards. Additional
FMI would add no further implications. However, the consequences of goods trade
and FMI di⁄er drastically if one believes in IRS. Goods trade then induces complete
specialization in goods production, whereas factor price equalization does not apply
anymore. FMI, on the other hand, may lead to declining areas or set the stage
for prospering regions by attracting capital and labor. Interestingly, Paul Romer
has recently proposed an innovative development strategy, labeled "charter cities",
which rests on IRS, sound institutions and complete factor mobility (Romer, 2010).
There is indeed strong evidence, both direct and indirect, in favor of (aggregate)
IRS. For instance, Schmitt-GrohØ (1997) reviews the empirical literature on IRS.
She reports that the degree of IRS (at the level of industries) ranges from 1.03
to 1.4 (Schmitt-GrohØ, 1997, Table 4). Graham and Temple (2006) argue that
models with IRS and multiple equilibria (ME) can explain a substantial part of the
international income disparity. Depending on the strength of the positive externality
in the manufacturing sector, they attribute between 18 percent and 50 percent to
2the presence of ME.1 Consequently, a careful discussion of the question raised above
should take IRS and factor mobility into account. Moreover, IRS in endogenous
input factors, as is well known, may give rise to ME. An important question, then,
is how the process of equilibrium selection works. Most theoretical models imply
that initial conditions are crucial (see, for instance, Galor, 1996; Deissenberg et al.,
2001). There are, however, also models showing that expectations may play an
important role in the process of equilibrium selection (Krugman, 1991; Galor, 1992;
Graham and Temple, 2006).
There is also substantial, although at this stage inconclusive, evidence on the
importance of expectations as driving force for economic growth. Sengupta and
Okamura (1995) estimate an error-correction model to identify the determinants
of economic growth in Japan between 1965 and 1990. They conclude that "future
expectations may play a stronger role than the historical endowments" (Sengupta
and Okamura, 1995, p. 494). Sauer et al. (2003) use time-series data for selected
industries (eight emerging countries in East Asia and Eastern Europe) to test for the
big push industrialization hypothesis (Murphy et al., 1989). Their results support
the basic idea that optimistic expectations play an important role in the process of
economic development. Harris and Ioannides (2000) investigate the relative impor-
tance of history versus expectations in US urban development by testing whether
asset prices (housing or land) are Granger causal for population. The authors are
more reluctant and conclude that "the results con￿rm the notion that expectations
1See also the literature discussed in Graham and Temple (2006, Section 2).
3at best help history along in determining whether a city dominates or languishes in
the periphery" (Harris and Ioannides, 2000, p. 9). Alesina et al. (1996) analyze the
relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample
of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. Economic growth in countries
and time periods with a high probability of government collapse is found to be
signi￿cantly lower than otherwise. They conclude that political instability induces
expectations about unfavorable (uncertain) future economic policy which unfolds a
detrimental impact on growth.
The list of theoretical papers dealing with the dynamic consequences of FMI
under IRS appears limited. Dellas and de Vries (1995) employ an OLG model with
learning externalities in ￿nal output production. The model features ME. The conse-
quences of drastic (precipitous) and gradual (piecemeal) FMI are investigated. The
authors identify conditions, in terms of initial endowments, under which a drastic
FMI leads to permanently lower, whereas a gradual integration leads to a perma-
nently higher level of world per capita income. Faini (1996) employs a two-regions,
small open economy model with labor mobility to investigate the link between con-
vergence, growth and factor mobility. The tradeable goods sector exhibits constant
returns to scale, while the non-tradeable goods sector exhibits IRS. It is shown that
neither long-run convergence nor long-run divergence is compelling. Both results
are possible and the outcome depends on the underlying set of parameters. Reichlin
and Rustichini (1998) employ a two-countries, one-sector model with labor hetero-
geneity, IRS, and labor mobility to explain persistent migration ￿ ows and the lack
4of cross-country convergence. The main result is that a labor exporting country
may either experience an increase or a decline in per capita GDP depending on the
composition of migration on early stages. These papers are clearly instructive and
show that the consequences of FMI under IRS are all but trivial. None of these
contributions takes, however, the role of expectations in the process of equilibrium
selection into account.
We develop a simple one-sector model of a small open economy to study the
dynamic consequences of FMI under IRS. FMI means that both input factors get
access to an outside option, i.e. capital can be invested abroad and workers may
start to emigrate. Agents (capital owners and workers) form rational expectations
about future factor rewards. The model features ME as well as (local and global)
indeterminacy. There is a multiplicity of expectations which give rise to self-ful￿lling
prophecies. A number of non-trivial implications are obtained: (i) The success of eco-
nomic development in response to FMI is determined by history and expectations.
(ii) The relative importance of expectations as determinant of economic success de-
pends on TFP. The economic reason is simply that the interdependence of decisions
(across groups) to engage in the domestic market sector increases with TFP. (iii)
The model implies that there is a multiplicity of admissible initial expectations. Ad-
missibility means that initial expectations must be fundamentally warranted. Initial
expectations do hence interact with fundamentals (initial conditions and TFP) in a
systematic fashion. This implies that, for instance, bad institutions (red tape and
corruption), which have a detrimental impact on TFP, may block favorable economic
5development because su¢ ciently optimistic expectations cannot be fundamentally
warranted under this side condition.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the model is developed and
its main properties are described. Section 3 is devoted to the interaction between
expectations and fundamentals. In Section 4 the model is applied to replicate three
stylized facts of macroeconomic development in East Germany since 1991. Section
5 summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
Consider a dynamic one-sector model of a perfectly competitive, small open econ-
omy. To enable a discussion of the dynamics of the regional income distribution,
we view this economy as being composed of a number of n ￿ 1 regions. If n = 1
there is just one single region which comprises the entire, small open economy. The
alternative case, i.e. n > 1, allows for a regional disaggregation.2 For simplicity
regions do not interact.3 FMI means that both input factors get access to an out-
side option, i.e. capital can be invested abroad and workers may emigrate. Moving
input factors out of or into the domestic market sector is associated with mobility
2This aspect will become relevant when applying the model to better understand the stylized
facts of macroeconomic development in East Germany (Section 4).
3This simplifying assumption is uncritical with regard to the major implications. For a, say,
declining region it does not matter whether capital and workers move to another region or move
abroad.
6costs. Agents form rational expectations about future factor rewards. Regions are
identical except for the initial amount of capital and labor allocated to the domestic
market sector and the degree of initial optimism or pessimism. The model features
IRS at the aggregate level due to external economies.
2.1 Production technology and factor prices










where A denotes a constant technology parameter (capturing TFP), Kj;i capital
employed by ￿rm j in region i, ￿ Ki the overall stock of capital in region i, Lj;i the
amount of labor employed by ￿rm j in region i, ￿ Li the overall amount of labor
employed in region i, and 0 < ￿;￿;a;b < 1 constant parameters, which satisfy
￿ + b < 1, ￿ + a < 1. There are constant returns to scale at the level of the
individual ￿rm, i.e. ￿ + ￿ = 1. Aggregating over ￿rms gives the aggregate output




i . At the aggregate level there are IRS,
i.e. it is assumed that ￿+￿+a+b > 1. The major implications, described below, do
not depend on the speci￿c mechanism which gives rise to aggregate IRS. Marshallian
externalities represent one widely used mechanism (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Graham















@Li > 0 and
@2ri
@Li@A > 0. Hence, the positive impact of addi-
tional workers employed in the domestic market sector on the incentive for capital
owners to engage in the domestic market economy, re￿ ected by ri, increases with the
TFP parameter A. Similarly, equation (3) implies
@wi
@Ki > 0 and
@2wi
@Ki@A > 0. Within
the context of the underlying model, as will become clear below, this implies that
the interdependence of decisions (across groups) to engage in the domestic market
sector increases with TFP. As a consequence, a higher level of TFP gives expecta-
tions a greater role in the process of equilibrium selection. In addition, a high TFP
level may facilitate su¢ ciently optimistic expectations such that an economy ex-
periences a favorable economic development despite comparably unfavorable initial
conditions.
Under (aggregate) IRS, factor rewards and per capita income are crucially deter-
mined by the amount of capital and labor allocated to the domestic market sector.
We therefore turn to the allocation decisions of capital owners and workers at next.
Despite considering both outward and inward capital ￿ ows as well as outward and
inward migration, the terminology is based on the perspective of domestic expatri-
ates. The domestic region / economy is often denoted as "the source", whereas the
rest of the world is denoted as "the destination".
82.2 Capital owners
Every region is populated by a continuum of length one of identical capital owners.4
Every capitalist is endowed with ￿ KS
i units of capital. Capital can be employed in the
region￿ s domestic market sector (source) earning a rate of return ri. Alternatively,
capital can be invested abroad (destination) to earn the ￿xed rate of return ￿ r > 0.
The representative capital owner in the source maximizes the present value of an
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i ,
where ￿ > 0 denotes the time preference rate and _ KS
i := dKS
i =dt. Moving capital
from the region￿ s domestic market sector to the outside option, or vice versa, causes
(symmetric and convex) capital adjustment costs which reduce current income, as






Ki denotes a control variable. More
precisely, moving one additional unit of capital from, say, the source to the desti-
nation causes relocation costs of
_ KS
i
￿K , i.e. marginal adjustment costs increase with
the ￿ ow of capital being transferred.5 The parameter ￿K > 0 is an inverse mea-
4To simplify, we assume that capital owners don￿ t move. The location of capital owners is not
important since we are interested in the determinants of GDP, not in the determinants of GNP.
5There are indeed convex capital reallocation costs at the individual level. This is consistent
with the following interpretation. If the individual capital owner transfers ￿nancial funds, no
9sure for the importance of adjustment costs. We assume that the typical capital
owner has all his capital ￿ KS
i allocated to the domestic market economy initially, i.e.
KS
i (0) = ￿ KS
i . Thus he can either keep all his capital inside the region￿ s domestic
market sector or start investing abroad. An increase in the region￿ s stock of capital
requires capital in￿ ows from abroad. To simplify the analysis, we assume that for-
eign capital investments are irreversible. This implies that capital once invested in,
say, the source cannot be invested again in the destination.
Let HS := HS(KS
i ;vS
Ki) denote the associated (current value) Hamiltonian func-









Ki + ￿Ki = 0 ) v
S
Ki = ￿K￿Ki (5)




= ￿￿Ki ￿ (ri ￿ ￿ r): (6)
Equation (5) says that, in equilibrium, marginal moving costs
vS
Ki
￿K must equal the
shadow price ￿Ki. Equation (6) indicates that ￿Ki(0) =
1 Z
0
(ri ￿ ￿ r)e￿￿tdt, i.e. ￿Ki(0)
gives the di⁄erence between earnings in the domestic market sector and in the outside
option in present value terms.6 Since the competitive rate of return ri depends on
the amount of capital and labor employed in the domestic market sector, ￿Ki(0)
captures expectations about future economic development.
cost is incurred. The accumulation of physical capital is, however, associated with convex capital
adjustment costs, even at the individual level according to Hayashi (1982).
6This solution for ￿Ki(0) requires that the boundary condition ￿Ki(T) = 0 (the so-called "soft
landing condition") holds, where T denotes the point in time where the economy hits a boundary
(see Section 3.1).
10The problem of the typical capital owner in the destination (rest of the world)









































Ki 8 i 2 f1;:::;ng
K
D
i (0) = 0 8 i 2 f1;:::;ng;0 ￿ K
D
i ￿ ￿ K
D.
where ￿ KD > 0 denotes the capital endowment, KD
i ￿ 0 the amount of capital
invested in region i, ￿ r the rate of return to capital in the destination, ri the rate of
return in region i, and vD
Ki choice variables, respectively. We assume KD
i (0) = 0 8 i 2
f1;:::;ng implying that the initial capital endowment is invested completely in the
destination. Similarly to the case considered above, the ￿rst-order conditions _ ￿Ki =
￿￿Ki ￿(ri ￿ ￿ r), together with appropriate border conditions, imply that the shadow
value placed on capital invested in region i is given by ￿Ki(0) =
1 Z
0
(ri ￿ ￿ r)e￿￿tdt.
Physical capital in region i, denoted as Ki, increases due to capital in￿ ows _ KD
i ￿
0 and decreases due to capital out￿ ows _ KS
i ￿ 0, i.e. _ Ki = _ KD
i + _ KS
i . Physical capital
in region i therefore changes according to (for details see the appendix)
_ Ki = ￿K￿Ki Q 0 for ￿Ki Q 0: (8)
2.3 Workers
There are Li(0) = Li;0 identical workers initially in region i, who live forever. Every
worker supplies one unit of time per period, independent of the wage rate, to the
11labor market. Domestic workers have the possibility to emigrate. Migration deci-
sions are modelled according to Braun (1993).7 The bene￿t of emigration at t = 0






(￿ w ￿ wi)e
￿￿tdt; (9)
where ￿ > 0 denotes the time preference rate, wi is the domestic competitive wage
rate, and ￿ w is the wage rate that can be earned in the destination. The bene￿t
of emigrating at t = 0 from the source to the destination, denoted as ￿
D
Li(0), is
given by the di⁄erence between earnings in the outside option (destination) and
in the domestic market sector (source) in present value terms. Since the domestic
competitive wage rate wi depends on the amount of capital and labor employed in
the domestic market sector, ￿
D
Li(0) captures expectations about the future economic
development.








i ￿ 0 denotes the ￿ ow of migrants from the source to the destination
per period of time. Equation (10) shows that (individual) migration costs increase
with the number of migrants, which may be due to congestion externalities (cf.
Braun, 1993, p. 24).8 The parameter ￿L > 0 is an inverse measure, given _ LSD
i ,
for the importance of the moving costs. The individual moving decision is a binary
7The Braun (1993) model of migration and growth represents a dynamic, representative-agent
model (see also Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Chapter 9.1.3).
8The key property is that the cost of moving for the marginal mover rises with the number of
12decision. Workers leave the economy if the bene￿t of emigration, re￿ ected by ￿
D
Li,
exceeds the migration costs, as given by mci. In a competitive equilibrium the bene￿t





i . Moreover, if the
bene￿t of emigration is zero, ￿
D
Li = 0, no one will want to emigrate, i.e. _ LSD
i = 0.
Similarly, provided that ￿
D
Li < 0, one gets _ LSD
i = 0. Migration from the source to






















(wi ￿ ￿ w)e￿￿tdt denote the value of being in the source (domestic










i ￿ 0 denotes the ￿ ow of migrants from the rest of the world to the domestic
















The rate of change of workers in the domestic region is the di⁄erence between
inward migration and outward migration, i.e. _ Li = _ LDS
i ￿ _ LSD
i . The number of
movers. This relation would also hold if there were heterogeneity with respect to moving costs.
The persons with lower costs would move sooner, and the cost of moving would therefore rise at
the margin with the number of movers (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 401).
13workers in region i therefore changes according to (for details see the appendix)
_ Li = ￿L￿
S
Li Q 0 for ￿
S
Li Q 0. (13)
A clari￿cation may be warranted. Consider a set of domestic regions with ￿
S
Li >
0. Does the model imply that the region with the highest ￿
S
Li attracts workers from
the rest of the world ￿rst and then other regions develop at next? Assuming that
there are enough workers outside the economy for a simultaneous development of
all regions with ￿
S
Li > 0, the answer is no.
As stated above, the focus is on the source. Therefore, we consider variables
that relate to the source only. Moreover, to simplify the notation we set ￿
S
Li = ￿Li.
This notation then implies that ￿Li < 0 captures pessimism in the sense that the
di⁄erence between wi and ￿ w, in present value terms, is negative.
2.4 Dynamic system and steady states
Noting (6), (8), (13) and di⁄erentiating ￿L(0) =
1 Z
0
(w ￿ ￿ w)e￿￿tdt with respect to t,
the dynamic system which governs the evolution of the economy within the interior
of the state space may be expressed as follows9
_ K = ￿K￿K (14)
_ L = ￿L￿L (15)
_ ￿K = ￿￿K ￿ (r ￿ ￿ r) (16)
9To simplify notation, the region index is suppressed whenever this does not lead to confusion.
14_ ￿L = ￿￿L ￿ (w ￿ ￿ w) (17)
K(0) = K0; L(0) = L0;
where r and w are given by (2) and (3). Provided that ￿K(0) and ￿L(0) are speci￿ed,
the above system describes a unique trajectory in four-dimensional (K;L;￿K;￿L)-
space. However, ￿K(0) and ￿L(0) are not uniquely determined. There is rather
a multiplicity of shadow price combinations [￿K(0);￿L(0)] which are admissible as
self-ful￿lling prophecies. Moreover, any set of admissible expectations [￿K(0);￿L(0)]
is restricted to be fundamentally warranted, as will be explained below.
A steady state is determined by _ K = _ L = _ ￿K = _ ￿L = 0. We ￿rst turn to the
interior steady state. From _ K = ￿K￿K and _ L = ￿L￿L one recognizes that _ K = _ L = 0
requires ￿K = ￿L = 0. From (16), (17), ￿K = ￿L = 0 (implying _ ￿K = _ ￿L = 0) one
gets r = ￿ r and w = ￿ w. These two equations in K and L characterize the interior


















Since ￿ + b < 1, ￿ + a < 1, and ￿ + ￿ + a + b > 1, it follows that, ￿rst, the RHS of
(18) is an increasing and concave function of K due to 0 < 1￿￿￿a
￿+b < 1 and, second,
the RHS of (19) is an increasing and convex function of K due to ￿+a
1￿￿￿b > 1. Hence,
10Notice, however, that r = ￿ r and w = ￿ w is necessary but not su¢ cient for _ K = 0 and _ L = 0;
su¢ cient for _ K = 0 ( _ L = 0) is ￿K = 0 (￿L = 0).
15there is a unique interior solution (K￿;L￿), as illustrated by point A in Figure 1.
There are also two boundary steady states. The lower (inferior) steady state is
(K = 0;L = 0), point C in Figure 1. The upper (superior) steady state reads
(K = K￿￿;L = ￿ L), point B in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Multiple equilibria
As regards the dynamics at the border of the state space, two aspects need to
be clari￿ed. First, the economy remains at the boundary once it touches the border
of the state space (see the appendix for details). Second, in a world of IRS we need
to ensure that factor in￿ ows sooner or later come to a halt. It is assumed that the
maximum number of workers that can move into a speci￿c region cannot exceed ￿ L.
This may be interpreted as capturing the importance of a third (￿xed) factor, land,
in the background. The maximum amount of capital, K￿￿, is then endogenously
16determined by r(K￿￿; ￿ L) = ￿ r. To illustrate, assume that the economy hits, say, the
upper L-boundary at t = T, i.e. L(T) = ￿ L, with 0 < K(T) < K￿￿. The dynamics
of the economy are then governed by (14), (16), and L = ￿ L. Capital in￿ ows take
place until r = ￿ r. This movement is sluggish because of convex adjustment costs
(for details see the appendix).
3 Expectations and fundamentals
3.1 Admissible expectations and equilibrium dynamics
The dynamic system (15) to (16), evaluated at the interior steady state, exhibits
three eigenvalues with positive real part. The interior steady state (point A in Fig-
ure 1) is hence locally unstable. Moreover, there is indeterminacy in the sense of a
multiplicity of admissible initial shadow prices [￿K(0);￿L(0)]. Admissible expecta-
tions and equilibrium trajectories must ful￿ll the following criteria (see the appendix
for details)
1. Equilibrium trajectories must approach the border of the state space tangen-
tial, i.e. must satisfy one of the "soft-landing conditions" _ K(T) = ￿K(T) = 0
or _ L(T) = ￿L(T) = 0. Once the economy hits the border it does not return
into the interior of the state space. Instead it moves along the boundary to
one of the border equilibria (B or C in Figure 1).
2. Given initial conditions K(0) = K0 and L(0) = L0, there is a multiplicity
17of initial shadow prices [￿K(0);￿L(0)] which are admissible as self-ful￿lling
prophecies. Hence, there is an in￿nite number of equilibrium trajectories,
indexed by initial shadow prices.
3. The set of admissible shadow prices must, ￿rst, equal the present value of
expected earning di⁄erentials and, second, must give rise to a trajectory that
satis￿es the soft-landing condition.
3.2 Interaction between expectations and fundamentals
Any region is characterized by a predetermined history in the sense of an initial
amount of capital and labor allocated to the domestic market sector. If the region
under study starts inside a speci￿c (K;L)-set, expectations (initial shadow prices)
determine whether the region moves towards the superior or inferior steady state, i.e.
the model exhibits global indeterminacy. Within this area of global indeterminacy
- or overlap, a term coined by Krugman (1991) - knowledge about initial state
variables is not su¢ cient to determine the ￿nal outcome. In contrast, if the economy
starts with su¢ ciently unfavorable initial conditions (i.e. southwest of the overlap) it
converges to the inferior steady state. Similarly, if it starts with su¢ ciently favorable
initial conditions (i.e. northeast of the overlap) it converges to the superior steady
state.
To visualize the area of global indeterminacy, we have discretized the state space,
i.e. we have de￿ned a grid of points in (K;L)-space. Then we have checked whether,
18for a speci￿c (K;L)-combination, there is at least one admissible set of expectations
[￿K(0);￿L(0)] which gives rise to a trajectory leading to the superior steady state
and, for the same (K;L)-combination, there is at least one set of admissible expec-
tations [￿K(0);￿L(0)] which gives rise to a trajectory leading to the inferior steady
state. If this condition is satis￿ed, the (K;L)-combination under consideration is an
element of the overlap. If this is not the case, the speci￿c (K;L)-combination lies
outside the overlap.11
Figure 2: Three exemplary regions (D, E, F) and a multiplicity of equilibrium
trajectories
11A description of the underlying numerical procedure is available from the authors upon request.
19Figure 2 illustrates the basic logic of the model. For expositional convenience
the size of the factor box was chosen such that the interior steady state is centered
in L-dimension and K-dimension and, in addition, is normalized to one. The area of
global indeterminacy is represented by the set of grey rectangles. Consider a region
starting with an initial endowment given by the coordinates of point D. Provided
that agents are su¢ ciently optimistic, both capital owners and workers increasingly
engage in the region￿ s domestic market sector. The region prospers and converges to
the superior equilibrium at B. In contrast, if agents are pessimistic both capital and
labor leave the region￿ s domestic market sector. The region declines and approaches
the inferior equilibrium at C.12 The region with initial endowment D, therefore,
exhibits global indeterminacy.
Local indeterminacy means that there is a multiplicity of equilibrium trajecto-
ries leading to, say, the superior equilibrium. Local indeterminacy may also be of
substantial economic interest. Consider again a region with an initial endowment
given by D and assume that expectations are such that the region prospers, i.e.
approaches the superior equilibrium at point B. The multiplicity of trajectories in-
dicates that the model can explain both a pattern of immigration and capital in￿ ows
(one of the upper trajectories) or a pattern of emigration followed by immigration
(i.e. migration reversals) and capital in￿ ows (one of the lower trajectories). The
trajectory which describes a migration reversal is based on ￿L(0) < 0 and ￿K(0) > 0
12Equilibrium trajectories could, of course, also hit the (lower or upper) K-boundary for interior
L-values. This pattern is, however, rarely observed for plausible calibrations.
20such that labor emigrates initially, _ L < 0, but capital is being attracted, _ K > 0.
Both _ L < 0 and _ K > 0 push the wage rate up such that ￿L(t) turns positive at
some t = t￿ implying that labor starts immigrating, i.e. _ L > 0, for t > t￿.
Next, consider a region with initial endowment given by E (i.e. northeast of the
overlap). It will unambiguously prosper and converge to the superior equilibrium at
B. Similarly, a region with initial endowment given by F (i.e. southwest of the area
of global indeterminacy) must converge towards the inferior equilibrium at C.
Figure 3: Frequency distribution (unit area histograms) of admissible initial expec-
tations of workers, ￿L(0), corresponding to the three exemplary regions (D, E, F)
shown in Figure 2
21Figure 3 displays the frequency distribution of admissible initial expectations of
workers ￿L(0).13 The upper graph shows the admissible ￿L(0) for region E. No-
tice that endowment E (together with the underlying TFP parameter) guarantees
optimism in the sense of ￿L(0) > 0. Moreover, there is obviously a multiplicity
of equilibrium expectations, illustrating local indeterminacy. The middle graph
shows the frequency distribution of admissible ￿L(0) for region D. This distribution
comprises two separate parts, which corresponds to the global indeterminacy im-
plication. For ￿L(0) taken from the left part of the distribution (i.e. comparably
unfavorable expectations), the economy declines and converges to the inferior equi-
librium at C, while for ￿L(0) taken from the right part (i.e. comparably favorable
expectations), the economy prospers and moves towards the superior equilibrium at
B. Finally, the lower graph shows the admissible initial shadow prices for region F.
Notice that ￿L(0) < 0 throughout, i.e. endowment F (together with the underlying
TFP parameter) dooms region F to be pessimistic.
Figure 4 shows that the size of the overlap increases with the TFP parameter
A. The small overlap applies for A = 0:05, whereas the large overlap applies for









@Ki@A > 0) strengthens the interdependence among
the agents￿decisions to engage in the domestic market sector across groups. As
will be explained below, this mechanism implies that sound institutions, industrial
traditions, and a strict supply-side policy give expectations a greater role in the
13A similar graph can be shown for the admissible initial expectations of capital owners ￿K(0).
22process of equilibrium selection.
Figure 4: Overlap in response to an increase in TFP (small overlap applies for
A = 0:05; large overlap applies for A = 0:1)
Is a large overlap good or bad? The answer is that it is neither good nor bad. A
large overlap may imply that, even under unfavorable initial conditions, the econ-
omy is capable, due to strong optimism, of moving towards the superior steady
state. In contrast, even under favorable initial conditions there is the risk that, due
to a high degree of pessimism, the inferior steady state is ultimately realized. In
this sense, the economy becomes more vulnerable against bad moods. Hence, an
adequate, although fairly general, proposition states that the relative importance of
23expectations vis-￿-vis history increases with the size of the overlap.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of admissible initial expectations ￿L(0) across
all regions in the factor endowment box for alternative TFP-levels. Due to the mul-
tiplicity of admissible expectations a speci￿c region contributes to distinct classes
of initial expectations. The graph demonstrates that an increase in TFP, holding
initial endowments constant, shifts probability mass to the right. This observation
demonstrates that a higher level of TFP enables a higher degree of optimism to
be fundamentally warranted. Moreover, one recognizes that expectations are not
completely exogenous. Initial expectations can be seen as being drawn from a dis-
tribution which is determined by fundamentals, i.e. initial endowments and the level
of TFP.
Figure 5: Frequency distribution (unit area histograms) of ￿L(0) across all regions
for A = 0:05 (upper diagram) and for A = 0:1 (lower diagram)
24In summary, an increase in TFP is ambiguous since it gives expectations a greater
role in the process of equilibrium selection, as demonstrated by Figure 4. This may
imply that, due to su¢ ciently unfavorable expectations, a region converges to the
inferior equilibrium despite comparably favorable fundamentals. On the other hand,
an increase in TFP is a good thing in that it increases, on average, the admissible
(i.e. fundamentally warranted) initial expectations, as demonstrated by Figure 5. A
more optimistic view becomes possible, implying that the chance for a prosperous
economic development increases.
3.3 Deep determinants of TFP
Since the interaction between expectations and TFP is of outstanding importance in
the process of equilibrium selection, as explained above, we sketch three prominent
approaches which point to the deep determinants of TFP.




i , where xi
denotes the amount of intermediate good i 2 f1;:::;Ng and 0 < ￿ < 1, N > 0
(Ethier, 1982; Romer, 1990). Employing the symmetry property (xi = x for all i)
and using x = K
N, where K denotes aggregate capital, one gets Y = N1￿￿L1￿￿K￿.
Assume that it costs F > 0 units of ￿nal output to set up a new x-￿rm and that
there is free entry into the x-sector. The number of x-￿rms in equilibrium may then
be stated as N = N(F) with N0(F) < 0. TFP, given by N1￿￿, is inversely related to
F, which may re￿ ect the consequence of bad institutions, i.e. red tape or corruption.
Our model therefore implies that bad institutions may block favorable economic
25development because su¢ ciently optimistic expectations cannot be fundamentally
warranted under this side condition.
Suppose next that the Y -technology is given by Y = K￿(BL)1￿￿ with labor
e¢ ciency (or average human capital) B depending on cumulated output per capita
according to _ B = ￿y ￿ ￿BB, where y = k￿B1￿￿ is output per capita and 0 < ￿ < 1
(Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986). The steady state level of B (determined by _ B = 0)






k. Accordingly, industrial traditions in the sense of a high
level of cumulated output, i.e. a high level of B, increases TFP and strengthens
the relative importance of expectations in the process of equilibrium selection. In
addition, it enables a high degree of optimism to be fundamentally warranted.
Finally, assume that Y = G￿K￿L1￿￿, where G denotes productive government
expenditures (Barro, 1990), ￿nanced according to G = q￿Y , where 0 < q < 1
denotes the share of tax receipts devoted to productive government expenditures







1￿￿. TFP, as given by (q￿)
￿
1￿￿, now depends positively on q and ￿.













1￿￿ . An increase in q enhances TFP with the
implications sketched above. An increase in ￿ unfolds, however, a non-monotonic
impact on w and r and, hence, on the relative importance of expectations.
264 The case of East Germany
The German reuni￿cation provides a drastic example of an economy that was subject
to a comprehensive integration shock. In 1991 a whole economy with hitherto highly
restricted capital and labor mobility, namely East Germany, became integrated into
a nearly frictionless world capital and labor market. We ask now whether the model
at hand is instructive when trying to better understand macroeconomic development
in East Germany in response to a comprehensive integration shock.14
4.1 Three striking empirical observations
Economic development in East Germany since the German reuni￿cation in 1991
exhibits three striking empirical characteristics.
Massive factor movements. There has been substantial labor out￿ ow and massive
capital in￿ ow. Between 1991 and 2009 about 60,000 people (0.4 percent of the pop-
ulation) emigrated from East Germany per annum (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005,
2009). There are important regional di⁄erences. Some regions shrank substantially
and, at the same time, there are regions which attracted people to a substantial
extent.15 At the same time, there has been a substantial in￿ ow of (private) capital.
14Theoretical papers on macroeconomic development in East Germany comprise Funke and
Strulik (2000) and Burda (2006) who investigate the pattern of East-West convergence as well as
Snower and Merkl (2006) and Uhlig (2006) who focus on unemployment.
15East-West migration is much more important compared to movements within East Germany.
The ratio of East-West migration and movements within East Germany ￿ uctuates between 70
27For instance, Burda (2006, p. 368) reports that capital in￿ ows between 1991 to 2004
amounted to 80 to 90 billion EUR, or about 20 percent of GDP, each year.
Limited East-West convergence. Real GDP per capita (per employee) in East
Germany relative to GDP per capita (per employee) in West Germany stood at
39 percent (41 percent) in 1991. It then increased at an impressive pace up to 63
percent (69 percent) in 1996. Subsequently, the process of East-West convergence
slowed down substantially. Relative GDP per capita (per employee) reached 69
percent (77 percent) in 2010. This leveling points to limited convergence of GDP
per capita (cf. also Uhlig, 2006, p. 383).
Regional divergence and emergence of twin peaks. Vollmer et al. (2011) de-
compose the (entire) German distribution of annual GDP per employee into two
components using a two-component normal mixture model for the years 1992 until
2006. This allows them to identify those counties ("Kreise") that moved from the
￿rst to the second component. Subsequently, a standard cross-sectional growth re-
gression is extended to include a mover dummy, which is highly signi￿cant. Vollmer
et al. (2011, p. 11) conclude that "...there are two distinct convergence clubs for
GDP per employee in the East of Germany.". There is also impressive descriptive
evidence for regional divergence and the emergence of a twin-peak structure in the
regional distribution of real GDP per capita (available from the authors). The kernel
density for the regional (at the level of counties) distribution of real GDP per capita
shows an unimodal income distribution in 1996 and a bimodal distribution in 2006.
percent and 85 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993-2011).
28Both limited East-West convergence and regional divergence are in stark con-
trast to the neoclassical model. This is reinforced by noting, ￿rst, that real GDP
per capita in East Germany relative to West Germany stood at about 120 per-
cent before WWII (Boltho et al., 1997, p. 257) and, second, the degree of factor
mobility appears to be quite high. East Germany has unrestricted access to the
international capital market and major migration costs associated with cultural and
lingual di⁄erences do not apply (Hunt, 2006). Moreover, there are substantial pro-
ductive government expenditures, funded by the central government, which aim at
a "harmonization of living conditions" (as prescribed by the German constitution)
by uniformly distributed public infrastructure investment.
4.2 Sketch of the underlying procedure
The model is evaluated in the following manner. First, we consider a "large number"
of regions i 2 f1;:::;ng. Every region starts with a speci￿c combination [Ki(0);Li(0)]
which is restricted to fall inside the upper left of the state plane (i.e. above the r = ￿ r-
isocline and to the left of the w = ￿ w-isocline). This assumption implies ri > ￿ r and
wi < ￿ w. This choice is part of the calibration strategy since we choose [Ki(0);Li(0)]
such that the model generates (aggregate) capital in￿ ows and (aggregate) labor out-
￿ ows. Second, we assume that, in every region, there are 0 <L< ￿ L inhabitants who
do not condition their migration decision on the wage di⁄erential, i.e. they stay in
29the source irrespective of ￿Li.16 Third, we focus on interior dynamics throughout.
This implies that we hold the coordinates [Ki(t);Li(t)] ￿x once a region has hit the
boundary of the state space. Accounting additionally for dynamics at the border
would not change the qualitative implications. Fourth, initial shadow prices ￿Li(0)
for every i 2 f1;:::;ng are drawn from a (non-parametric) probability distribution,
which is region speci￿c, as shown in Figure 3. The values of ￿Ki(0) are then deter-
mined by the soft-landing condition, i.e. ￿Li(T) = 0 or ￿Ki(T) = 0, where T denotes
the point in time when the economy hits a boundary. Once, Ki(0);Li(0), ￿Ki(0) and
￿Li(0) are speci￿ed, one can trace out Ki(t);Li(t) for all t 2 [0;T] and i 2 f1;:::;ng.





Initial conditions [Ki(0);Li(0)] are selected, as mentioned above, such that ri > ￿ r
and wi < ￿ w. This is in line with the observation of (aggregate) capital in￿ ows
and (aggregate) labor out￿ ows. The technology parameters are chosen as follows:
￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:7, a = 0:075, b = 0:075. The implied degree of IRS of 1:15 lies inside
the empirically plausible range (Schmitt-GrohØ, 1997; Graham and Temple, 2006).
The rate of return on capital is set to ￿ r = 0:04 and the wage rate in the outside
option is normalized to one, i.e. ￿ w = 1. The time preference rate is set to ￿ = 0:01
16The calibration below assumes a value for L and initial conditions Li(0) such that, on average,
about 4 percent of the domestic population are assumed not to move.
30and the TFP parameter reads A = 1:1.17 Moreover, we have set ￿ L = 1:5L￿, where
L￿ is the interior steady state value. K￿￿ is then endogenously determined. This
implies that a successful region, in the steady state, exhibits a GDP per employee
which is 5 percent higher than (average) GDP per employee in West Germany.
The mobility cost parameter ￿L = 0:025 is determined as follows. Equation (15)
says that ￿L =
_ L
￿L. To determine _ L we notice that about 2:4 percent of the East
German labor force left East Germany in 1991 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005).
Hence, the appropriately scaled _ L reads _ L = ￿0:024
Pn
i Li(0). Given _ L, the initial
conditions [Ki(0);Li(0)], the above mentioned parameters, and an initial guess for
￿L and ￿K, we can calculate a frequency distribution across all regions; in analogy
to the frequency distributions shown in Figure 5. This frequency distribution gives
us E[￿Li(0)]. Now we adjust ￿L, and repeat the simulation iteratively, until the
implied E[￿Li(0)] matches ￿L =
_ L
E(￿L). Capital mobility costs are set equal to labor
mobility costs, i.e. ￿K = ￿L.18
17The value A = 1:1 does not mean that the overlap comprises nearly the entire state plane, as
one could conjecture with regard to the A-values employed in Section 3. The reason is twofold.
First, the overlap seems to converge to a limiting set (a subset of the state plane) as A increases
and, second, other parameters, like ￿L and ￿K, also have an impact.
18One might object that capital is more mobile than labor, i.e. ￿K > ￿L. However, this is not
clear if we think of real capital instead of ￿nancial capital. Also, we have experimented with other
constellations, i.e. ￿K > ￿L and ￿K < ￿L. The qualitative results do not change.
31Technological elasticities ￿ = 0:3; ￿ = 0:7; a = 0:075; b = 0:075
Preference and outside option ￿ = 0:01; ￿ r = 0:04; ￿ w = 1
Expectations and mobility costs (implied) E[￿Li(0)] ’ ￿10; ￿L= ￿K= 0:025
Table 1: Set of parameters
4.4 Limited East-West convergence and twin peaks
We now demonstrate that the model can replicate limited East-West convergence as
well as the emergence of a twin-peak structure in the regional income distribution.
Notice at ￿rst that, within our model, Y
L may be interpreted either as GDP per
capita or as GDP per employee, since the model abstracts from unemployment.
When it comes to a comparison between model implications and empirical data, it
is clearly appropriate to interpret Y
L as GDP per employee. With regard to limited
East-West convergence of GDP per employee we focus on the following metric. The
competitive wage rate in West Germany, which constitutes the outside option for
East German workers, is given by ￿ w = ￿ Y W
LW . This implies that GDP per employee
in West Germany may be written as Y W
LW = ￿ w
￿. East German GDP per employee,






















Figure 6 shows the time path
Y E=LE
Y W=LW resulting from model simulation by apply-
ing the procedure and calibration described above (solid line). The empirical series
32for
Y E=LE
Y W=LW is represented by the dashed line. One can recognize that relative GDP
per employee starts at
Y E=LE
Y W=LW ’ 0:41 and converges to
Y E=LE
Y W=LW ’ 0:83. This illus-
trates that the model can replicate limited convergence. About 5 percent of regions
converge to the superior, while 95 percent of regions converge to the inferior steady
state. The hump-shaped pattern of
Y E=LE
Y W=LW between t = 0 and t = 5, displayed in
Figure 6 (solid line), results from the fact that those regions which converge to the
inferior steady state may temporarily experience an increase in GDP per employee
since labor may leave individual regions more rapidly than capital ￿ ows out of this






Figure 6: Limited East-West convergence of real GDP per employee (dashed line:
empirical series; solid line: theoretical series)
33We ￿nally turn to regional divergence and the emergence of twin peaks in the
regional income distribution. Figure 7 (left panel) demonstrates that the model,
given the initial set of (KE
i ;LE
i )-coordinates according to the calibration strategy
outlined above, does indeed imply an unimodal regional income distribution, which
is in line with empirical observations. Figure 7 (right panel) shows that the regional
income distribution after 20 years is clearly bimodal. Thus, the model can replicate
regional divergence (the maximum deviation has increased) and the emergence of a
twin-peak structure in East Germany.
Figure 7: Regional income distribution (kernel densities) at t = 0 (left graph) and
at t = 20 (right graph)
In summary, the model under study can replicate limited East-West convergence
as well as the emergence of twin peaks in the regional income distribution. The
model is also in line with regional heterogeneity in labor movements as well as
34migration reversals (cf. also Figure 2), which can indeed be observed for a number of
East German counties (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993-2011). Hence, we believe that
the model points to an underlying economic structure and associated mechanisms
that appear helpful when trying to better understand East German macroeconomic
development since 1991.
5 Summary and conclusion
Does a comprehensive integration shock set the stage for ongoing prosperity or does
it doom to gradual economic decline? This question has been discussed by employing
a model of a small open economy under increasing returns to scale. Due to multiple
steady states as well as local and global indeterminacy, the underlying model creates
a rich set of plausible implications. It has been shown that the outcome depends
on a number of side conditions, like initial state variables, total factor productivity,
and expectations about the future domestic factor rewards.
Our analysis contributes also to a better understanding of the interaction be-
tween expectations and fundamentals in models with indeterminacy. It has been
shown that (i) the relative importance of expectations as determinant of economic
success depends on total factor productivity (TFP) and (ii) expectations depend
on fundamentals (initial conditions and TFP) in a systematic fashion. This insight
has far reaching economic implications. For instance, bad institutions may block
favorable economic development because su¢ ciently optimistic expectations cannot
35be fundamentally warranted under this side condition.
We believe that our analysis is not only important with regard to factor market
integration. The main implications should also apply to cases where the factors of
production become endogenous. This may be due to institutional or technological
changes. For instance, instead of using the metaphor "agents get the opportunity to
move across borders" one may think of an economy that starts developing a capital
market or an educational system.
Finally, the model has been applied to replicate two striking empirical charac-
teristics of macroeconomic development in East Germany since 1991. It has been
demonstrated that it can replicate limited East-West convergence and the emergence
of a twin-peak structure in the regional income distribution, which represents a puz-
zle for the standard neoclassical model. In addition, the model is in line with regional
heterogeneity in labor movements as well as migration reversals. We believe that
the model points to an underlying economic structure and associated mechanisms
that are helpful when trying to better understand macroeconomic development in
East Germany since 1991.
366 Appendix
6.1 Equations (8) and (13)
Capital - equ. (8). The (current-value) Hamiltonian function associated with
problem (7) and the ￿rst-order conditions read
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Ki + ￿Ki = 0 ) v
D
Ki = ￿K￿Ki 8 i 2 f1;:::;ng (20)




= ￿￿Ki ￿ (ri ￿ ￿ r) 8 i 2 f1;:::;ng:
Physical capital in region i, denoted as Ki, increases due to capital in￿ ows _ KD
i ￿
0 and decreases due to capital out￿ ows _ KS
i ￿ 0, i.e.









From the ￿rst-order condition @HS
@vS
Ki
= 0 associated with problem (4) and the
￿rst-order conditions _ KD








￿K￿Ki for ￿Ki < 0








￿K￿Ki for ￿Ki > 0
0 for ￿Ki ￿ 0
: (23)
We now draw the following case distinction
19We also assume that there is enough capital outside the economy for a simultaneous develop-
ment of all regions heading towards the superior equilibrium.
















3. Assume ￿Ki > 0. Noting (21), (22) and (23) this yields _ Ki = _ KD






In summary, the equation of motion for Ki reads
_ Ki = ￿K￿Ki Q 0 for ￿Ki Q 0: (24)
This is equ. (8) in the main text.
Workers - equ. (13). The number of workers in the domestic region, denoted
as Li, changes according to









We now draw the following case distinction
1. Assume ￿
S
Li < 0 (i.e. ￿
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Li > 0 (i.e. ￿
D
Li < 0). Noting (11), (12), (13), this gives _ Li =
_ LDS







38In summary, the equation of motion for Li may be expressed as follows
_ Li = ￿L￿
S
Li Q 0 for ￿
S
Li Q 0: (26)
This is equ. (13) in the main text.
6.2 Notes on stability
We proceed in two steps. First, we assume that ￿ = ￿ = a = b = 0:5. The dynamic
system then becomes linear such that eigenvalues can be determined analytically.
Second, we set ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:7, as in the baseline set of parameters in the main
text, and determine the eigenvalues for alternative values of a and b numerically.
Assuming ￿ = ￿ = a = b = 0:5 the Jacobian matrix of system (15) to (16) is
J =
0
B B B B B
B B B B B
@
0 0 ￿L 0
0 0 0 ￿K
0 ￿0:5A ￿ 0
￿0:5A 0 0 ￿
1
C C C C C
C C C C C
A
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Several remarks are at order:




￿L￿K, which boils down to 2A
p
￿L￿K > 0 being always true.
392. As regards r1;2, we need a case distinction: Provided that ￿2 < 2A
p
￿L￿K
eigenvalues r1;2 are conjugate complex with positive real parts 1
2￿ > 0.
3. If, on the other hand, ￿2 > 2A
p
￿L￿K eigenvalues r1;2 are real. Eigenvalue




￿L￿K. This condition boils
down to 2A
p
￿L￿K > 0, which is always true.
Figure A1 demonstrates that the eigenvalue con￿guration, given ￿ = 0:3 and
￿ = 0:7, is robust with respect to changes in a and b.
Figure 8: Eigenvalues (real parts) in response to changes in a and b. Notice that
the horizontal line represents the two (identical) real parts of a pair of conjugate
complex eigenvalues
To summarize, there are always three eigenvalues with positive real part and one
eigenvalue with negative real part. Since there are two jump variables and three
40unstable roots, the interior steady state is unstable. There is a three-dimensional
unstable manifold leading away from the interior steady state. Since there are two
(predetermined) state variables and two jump variables, there is indeterminacy in
the sense of a multiplicity of admissible initial shadow prices [￿L(0);￿K(0)].
6.3 Notes on equilibrium dynamics
Reasoning of Fukao and Benabou (1993). Fukao and Benabou (1993, Proposi-
tion 2) have shown that, within the one-factor Krugman (1991) model, equilibrium
trajectories must satisfy two conditions: (i) the shadow price of the factor reaching
the boundary must approach zero and (ii) once the boundary has been touched,
equilibrium implies that the economy remains at the boundary forever. The reason-
ing relies on an arbitrage condition, which must hold in equilibrium, and applies also
to the model under study: Assume that the economy hits, say, the lower L-boundary
at t = T (i.e. L(T) = 0 with K > 0) with ￿L(T) < 0. In this case, each individual
worker has an incentive to deviate from the trajectory under consideration since he
can realize the gain, re￿ ected by ￿L(T) < 0, an instant in time later and thereby
avoid all relocation costs (the individual is of measure zero) by moving one instant
in time later. Hence, any equilibrium trajectory must hit the L-boundary such that
￿L(T) = 0.
A similar reasoning applies to the case when the economy is located at the
boundary and remains there forever. Assume the economy is located at the lower
L-boundary (i.e. L = 0 and K > 0). In this case w > ￿ w applies. It would indeed be
41optimal for workers to return into the domestic market sector. This will, however,
never happen. Each individual worker has an incentive to realize the gain, re￿ ected
by w > ￿ w, an instant in time later by moving alone and thereby avoid relocation
costs. Hence, the fact that the economy does not return into the interior of the state
region is essentially due to a coordination failure in market equilibrium.
The arbitrage argument used here relies on one crucial assumption, namely that
the individual agent is of measure zero. This guarantees that the deviation of any
individual from a given trajectory does not change competitive factor rewards and
hence leaves ￿K and ￿L unchanged. Moreover, this assumption guarantees that
relocation costs are zero if one agent moves in isolation.20 Therefore, this reasoning
extends to the two-factor case under consideration with atomistic agents implying
that equilibrium trajectories must approach the border of the state region tangential,
i.e. satisfying either _ L(T) = ￿L(T) = 0 or _ K(T) = ￿K(T) = 0 and, in addition,
remains at the border of the state space once the economy hits the boundary.
Boundary dynamics. Assume that the economy hits, say, the L-border at
t = T, i.e. L(T) = 0 or L(T) = ￿ L, with 0 < K(T) < ￿ K. The dynamics are then
governed by (14) and (16) (noting that L(T) = 0 or L(T) = ￿ L). The shadow price
￿K at t = T jumps in order to satisfy the transversality condition. Next assume
that the economy hits the K-border at t = T, i.e. K(T) = 0 or K(T) = ￿ K,
with 0 < L(T) < ￿ L. The dynamics are then governed by (15) and (17) (noting
20Notice that "reallocation costs" are essentially congestion costs, i.e. marginal moving costs are
zero at the origin.
42that K(T) = 0 or K(T) = ￿ K). The shadow price ￿L at t = T jumps in order to
satisfy the transversality condition. A non-formal sketch of equilibrium dynamics
at the border of the state space is as follows. Assume that the economy touches the
K-axis at t = T, i.e. L(T) = 0. The rate of return then is r(T) = 0 and, hence,
capital leaves the domestic market sector (in ￿nite time). This movement is sluggish
because of convex adjustment costs. An equivalent reasoning applies for K(T) = 0
and w(T) = 0. Now assume that the economy touches the upper border of the state
region, i.e. L(T) = ￿ L for some t = T. Assume further that r(￿ L; ￿ K) > ￿ r. Capital
allocated to the domestic market sector is increased until r = ￿ r. An equivalent
reasoning holds true if the economy hits the right border of the state region K = ￿ K.
References
[1] Alesina Alberto, Sule ￿zler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel, Political In-
stability and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Growth, 1996, Vol. 1,
189-211.
[2] Arrow, Kenneth J. (1962): The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing.
In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 29 (1962), 155-173.
[3] Barro, Robert J., Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous
Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 1990, Vol. 98, No. 2, S103-S125.
[4] Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, MIT Press, 2004.
43[5] Boltho, A., W. Carlin, P. Scaramozzino, Will East Germany become a New
Mezzogiorno?, Journal of Comparative Economics 24, 1997, 241-264.
[6] Braun, J., Essays on Economic Growth and Migration, 1993, Cambridge MA,
Harvard University, Ph.D. Dissertation.
[7] Burda, Michael C.,"Factor Reallocation in Eastern Germany after Reuni￿ca-
tion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 2006, vol.
96(2), 368-374.
[8] Dellas, Harris and Casper G. de Vries, "Piecemeal versus Precipitous Fac-
tor Market Integration," International Economic Review, Department of Eco-
nomics, 1995, vol. 36(3), 569-82.
[9] Deissenberg, C., G. Feichtinger, W. Semmler, and F. Wirl, History Dependence
and Global Dynamics in Models with ME, Working Paper No. 12, Center for
Empirical Macroeconomics, 2001.
[10] Ethier, W. J. (1982), National and international returns to scale in the modern
theory of international trade, American Economic Review 72, 389-405.
[11] Faini, Riccardo, Increasing returns, migration and convergence, Journal of De-
velopment Economics, Vol. 49, 1996, 121-136.
[12] Fukao, Kyoji and Ronald Benabou, History versus Expectations: A Comment,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108, 535-542.
44[13] Funke, Michael and Holger Strulik, Growth and Convergence in a Two-Region
Model of Uni￿ed Germany, German Economic Review, 2000, Vol. 1, 363-384.
[14] Galor Oded, "A Two-Sector Overlapping-Generations Model: A characteriza-
tion of the Dynamical System," Econometrica, 1992, 60, 351-386.
[15] Galor Oded, "Convergence? Inferences from Theoretical Models," Economic
Journal, 1996, Vol. 106, No. 437, 1056-1069.
[16] Graham, B.S. and J.R.W. Temple, Rich nations, poor nations: How much can
multiple equilibria explain?, Journal of Economic Growth 11 (2006), 5￿ 41.
[17] Harris, Timothy F. and Yannis M. Ioannides, 2000. "History versus Expecta-
tions: an Empirical Investigation," Discussion Papers Series, Department of
Economics, Tufts University 0014, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
[18] Hayashi, F., Tobin￿ s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation,
Econometrica, 1982, 50, 213-224.
[19] Hunt, Jennifer, Staunching emigration from East Germany: age and the deter-
minants of migration, Journal of the European Economic Society, 2006, 4(5),
1014-1037.
[20] Krugman, P., History versus Expectations, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1991, 106, 651-667.
45[21] Mora, Toni, Esther Vaya, and Jordi Surinach, 2004. "The Enlargement of the
European Union and the Spatial Distribution of Economic Activity," Eastern
European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 42(5), 6-35.
[22] Murphy, K.M., A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny, Industrialization and the Big Push,
Journal of Political Economy, 1989, Vol. 97, No. 5, 1003-10026.
[23] Reichlin, Pietro and Aldo Rustichini, Diverging patterns with endogenous labor
migration, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 22, 1998, 703-728.
[24] Romer, Paul M. (1986): Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. In: Journal
of Political Economy, 1986, Vol. 94, No. 6, 1002-1037.
[25] Romer, Paul M. (1990): Endogenous Technological Change. In: Journal of
Political Economy, 1990, Vol.98, No. 5, S71-S101.
[26] Romer, Paul M., Technologies, Rules, and Progress: The Case for Charter
Cities, Center for Global Development Essay, March 2010.
[27] O￿ Rourke, Kevin H. and Je⁄rey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The
Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy. MIT Press, 1999.
[28] Sauer, Christine, Kishore Gawande, and Geng Li, (2003) "Big push industrial-
ization: some empirical evidence for East Asia and Eastern Europe." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 9, 1-7.
46[29] Schmitt-GrohØ, S., Comparing Four Models of Aggregate Fluctuations due to
Self-Ful￿lling Expectations, Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 72, 96-147.
[30] Sengupta, Jati K. and Kumiko Okamura, History versus expectations: test of
new growth theory, Applied Economics Letters, Volume 2, Issue 12, 1995, 491
- 494.
[31] Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2002. "Germany￿ s Economic Uni￿cation: An Assessment
after Ten Years," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol.
10(1), 113-28.
[32] Snower, Dennis J. & Christian Merkl, 2006. "The Caring Hand that Cripples:
The East German Labor Market after Reuni￿cation," American Economic Re-
view, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), 375-382.
[33] Statistisches Bundesamt (1993-2011): Fachserie 1, Reihe 1.2: Bev￿lkerung und
Erwerbst￿tigkeit, Wiesbaden.
[34] Statistisches Bundesamt (2005): Abwanderung von Ost- nach Westdeutschland
schw￿cht sich weiter ab, Pressemitteilung Nr. 409 (dated: September 28, 2005),
Wiesbaden.
[35] Statistisches Bundesamt (2009): Bev￿lkerung und Erwerbst￿tigkeit. Wanderun-
gen, Fachserie 1, Reihe 1.2, Wiesbaden.
47[36] Uhlig, Harald, 2006. "Regional Labor Markets, Network Externalities and Mi-
gration: The Case of German Reuni￿cation," American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), 383-387.
[37] Vollmer, Sebastian, Hajo Holzmann, Florian Ketterer, and Stephan Klasen,
Distribution Dynamics of Regional GDP per Employee in Uni￿ed Germany,
Empirical Economics, accepted November 2011.
48